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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found forty-three-year-old Ernest James 
Trujillo guilty of felony forgery with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed. On 
appeal, Mr. Trujillo asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
into evidence a previously-excluded statement from one of his recorded jail telephone 
calls, and when it imposed his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At a Boise Moneytree payday loan check cashing business, Mr. Trujillo cashed a 
check for $375.00 drawn from the account of Christianna Muller. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3; Tr., p.151, L.6 - p.152, L.6, p.158, Ls.3-5, 
p.209, L.14 - p.211, L.6.) Mr. Trujillo used $60.00 from the check to pay a previous bill 
he owed to Moneytree, and gave the rest to his girlfriend, Gwynn Muller. (PSI, p.3; 
Tr., p.153, L.22 - p.154, L.8, p.211, Ls.7-24.) Christianna Muller and Gwynn Muller 
were sisters. (PSI, p.3; Tr., p.148, Ls.2-4.) 
About a week later, Christianna Muller reported that her checkbook had been 
stolen and a check had been written on her account in the amount of $375.00. (PSI, 
p.3.) The check had been made out to Mr. Trujillo, who she did not know. (PSI, p.3.) 
Christianna Muller suspected that her sister had stolen the checks. (PSI, p.3.) 
When questioned, Mr. Trujillo stated that he did yard work for Christianna Muller 
and was hired through Gwynn Muller. (PSI, p.3.) Later, at trial Mr. Trujillo testified that 
he gave the money to Gwynn Muller because it was hers, and that he cashed the check 
for her because he knew she did not have any identification. (Tr., p.209, L.23 - p.211, 
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L.24.) When she gave him the check, Mr. Trujillo "just barely glanced at it and saw my 
name on it." (Tr., p.210, Ls.10-16.) Mr. Trujillo did not graduate from high school, and 
during his presentence investigation and at trial he reported that he had problems with 
reading. (PSI, pp.4-5; Tr., p.204, L.19 - p.205, L.1.) 
The State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Trujillo had committed the crime of 
forgery, felony, in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-3601. (R., pp.8-9.) After the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate found probable cause and bound Mr. Trujillo over to the district 
court. (R., pp.23-25.) The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Trujillo with the 
above offense. (R., pp.28-29.) Mr. Trujillo pleaded not guilty to the charge. (R., p.32.) 
The State then filed Part II of the Information, alleging Mr. Trujillo was a persistent 
violator pursuant to I.C.§ 19-2514. (R., pp.36-38.) 
Later, Mr. Trujillo was charged with new criminal charges, including felony 
possession of a controlled substance, in a separate case, Ada County No. CR 2012-
9803 (hereinafter, the possession case). (See R., p.48.) Mr. Trujillo subsequently 
entered into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would plead guilty via Alford 
plea 1 to an amended charge of grand theft in the instant case. (R., pp.54-64.) The 
State would agree to dismiss the possession case and cap its sentencing 
recommendation for the instant case at a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three 
years fixed. (R., p.54.) Mr. Trujillo would be free to argue for less. (R., p.54.) The 
district court accepted the guilty plea. (R., p.54.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it would set over the 
cases and give Mr. Trujillo the opportunity to withdraw his pleas, because in the PSI it 
appeared that Mr. Trujillo claimed that he was not guilty of the crime charged in the 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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instant case. (R., p.65.) Mr. Trujillo then withdrew his guilty pleas. (See R., p.66.) The 
district court set the instant case for trial first, and stated that it would reset the 
possession case for after the conclusion of the trial in the instant case. (R., p.66; see 
R., p.84.) 
During a pretrial conference, Mr. Trujillo objected to the admission into evidence 
of a portion of one of three recordings of telephone calls placed by Mr. Trujillo from jail. 
(R., pp.84-85.) Specifically, Mr. Trujillo objected to the admission of his statement, "I'm 
thinking I might get probation for being accessory to it," on the basis that it was 
confusing for a jury.2 (See R. p.84; State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) The State responded 
that it felt that the statement was an acknowledgement of guilt, that the risk of confusion 
did not outweigh the statement's relevance, and that the statement was probative of 
elements the State needed to prove. (R., p.84.) The State also felt that it was a weight 
of the evidence issue, not an admissibility issue. (R., p.84.) 
The district court was concerned that it was clear that it was an excerpt from a 
much longer conversation, and that there were a number of interpretations. (R., p.84.) 
The district court, recognizing that an Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 analysis involves the 
district court's discretion and that the district court must weigh any probative value 
against any unfair prejudice or confusion, subsequently found that the statement was 
probative, but that it would exclude the statement given the totality of the excerpt. 
(R., p.84.) The district court stated it would think about the issue a little more, and left 
open the possibility of changing its mind. (R., p.84.) In a subsequent pretrial 
2 As reflected in the audio recording of the jail telephone call, Mr. Trujillo stated, "I'm 
thinking I might get probation for being accessory to it." (State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) In 
the court minutes of the pretrial conference, it appears that Mr. Trujillo's counsel 
paraphrased the statement as follows: "I think I'll get probation because I'm only an 
accessory." (See R., p.84.) 
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conference, the State asked the district court to reconsider its ruling on the statement, 
and the district court indicated that it would review the recording again. (R., p.87.) 
At the beginning of the jury trial, the district court informed the parties that it had 
reviewed the excerpt including the excluded statement, and decided "in listening to it 
and putting it in the context of the entirety of that tape, it's clear that it has probative 
value of guilt and acknowledgement of his own-on Mr. Trujillo's part in the forgery." 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.3-13.) According to the district court, "what comes clear to me is that, one, 
he knew that some woman, who's unidentified, but I assume it's the potential co-
defendant, put his name on the check and that he actually passed it. The jury-the 
State has to prove that he knew that it had been forged when he passed it." (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.14-20.) Thus, the district court decided "that the probative value is not substantially 
outweighed by any unfair prejudice to Mr. Trujillo and it does not have a tendency to 
confuse the jury." (Tr., p.6, Ls.21-24.) Later, the district court emphasized that "I've 
reversed my decision, having, again, applied a 403 analysis and finding that its 
probative value is not substantially outweighed." (Tr., p.7, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Trujillo had a 
continuing objection to the admission of the previously-excluded statement. (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.9-13.) 
During Mr. Trujillo's jury trial in the instant case, the State successfully moved to 
admit the jail telephone call recordings, including the recording containing the 
previously-excluded statement, into evidence (Tr., p.173, L.12 - p.17 4, L.6), and later 
published the recordings for the jury (Tr., p.188, L.3 - p.189, L.1 ). When the State 
moved to admit the recording containing the statement, Mr. Trujillo indicated he was still 
objecting as "previously noted." (Tr., p.174, L.25 - p.174, L.4.) Mr. Trujillo 
subsequently testified in his own defense. (Tr., p.204, Ls.1-11.) At the conclusion of 
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the trial, the jury found Mr. Trujillo guilty. (R., p.116; Tr., p.268, L.20 - p.269, L.5.) The 
jury then found that Mr. Trujillo was a persistent violator. (R., p.123; Tr., p.285, L.18 -
p.286, L.9.) 
After the conclusion of the jury trial in the instant case, Mr. Trujillo entered into 
another plea agreement with the State in the possession case, and pleaded guilty to the 
felony possession of a controlled substance charge. ( See R., p.125.) The district court 
accepted Mr. Trujillo's guilty plea in the possession case. (R., p.125.) 
At the sentencing hearing for the instant case and the possession case, the State 
recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of twenty years, with five 
years fixed, in the instant case. (R., p.129.) Mr. Trujillo requested that the district court 
impose a sentence that would shift the burden to him, allow him to control his own 
destiny, and put the opportunity to change in his own hands. (R., p.129.) In the instant 
case, the district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years 
fixed. (R., pp.129, 131-35.) In the possession case, the district court imposed a 
concurrent unified sentence of seven years. (R., p.129.) 
Mr. Trujillo then filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for Reduction of 
Sentence and for Leave ("Rule 35") "to supplement the motion with supporting 
documentation and/or other evidence." (R., pp.139-40.) The district court denied the 
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.143-46.)3 
3 In the order denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court stated that, "[i]n his motion, 
[Mr.] Trujillo indicated he would file additional memoranda 'at a later date,' but filed no 
supporting documentation and failed to indicate what, if any, additional material he 
would file." (R., p.143.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a 
Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new 
or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the 
Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the 
denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying 
sentence absent the presentation of new information." Id. 
5 
Mr. Trujillo subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal.4 (R., pp.147-50.) 
4 Mr. Trujillo has also filed an appeal in the possession case, under Supreme Court 
Docket No. 41134. Because the briefing in No. 41134 is already complete, there is no 
reason to consolidate the two cases. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the 
previously-excluded statement from one of Mr. Trujillo's recorded jail 
telephone calls? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
fourteen years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Trujillo following his conviction 
for felony forgery? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Into Evidence The 
Previously-Excluded Statement From One Of Mr. Trujillo's Recorded Jail 
Telephone Calls 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Trujillo asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
into evidence the previously-excluded statement, "I'm thinking I might get probation for 
being accessory to it." (See State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) Because the previously-
excluded statement is of marginal probative value, and the danger of confusion of the 
issues substantially outweighs the marginal probative value of the statement, the district 
court should have continued to exclude the statement pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence ("I.R.E.") 403. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it 
admitted the statement into evidence. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"[T]he [Idaho] Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of a// evidence 
in the courts of this State." State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240 (2009) (emphasis in 
original). "All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state." I.R.E. 402. Evidence is 
relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
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presentation of cumulative evidence." I.R.E. 403. 'To exclude evidence under Rule 
403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by one of the considerations listed in the Rule." State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 
469, 471 (2010). "The trial court's 1.R.E. 403 determination will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 667 (2010). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Under Idaho Rule Of Evidence 403, 
Because The Marginal Probative Value Of The Statement Is Substantially 
Outweighed By The Danger Of Confusion Of The Issues 
The issue here is whether the district court, when it admitted the previously-
excluded statement into evidence, abused its discretion under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
403 by finding that the probative value of the statement was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or unfair prejudice to Mr. Trujillo. 
Mr. Trujillo submits that the marginal probative value of the statement is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues. Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion when it admitted the statement into evidence. 
Mr. Trujillo's previously-excluded statement, "I'm thinking I might get probation for 
being accessory to it" (State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05), is of marginal probative value. The 
State argued that the statement was an acknowledgement of guilt. (R., p.84.) 
However, Mr. Trujillo did not directly state that he was guilty or that he was an 
accessory, but only stated that he was "thinking" that he could get probation for being 
an accessory. (See State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) Thus the statement may also be 
reasonably interpreted as being Mr. Trujillo's prediction of the outcome of the case. 
(See State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) This reasonable interpretation is distinguishable from 
the State's interpretation because a prediction of the outcome of the case does not 
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constitute an admission of guilt. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28-29, 37-
38 (1970). Additionally, the statement may be reasonably interpreted as Mr. Trujillo's 
speculation as to the consequences if he were found guilty. ( See State's Ex. 2, 00:03-
00:05.) Because the statement is susceptible to multiple interpretations, it is of marginal 
probative value. 
The marginal probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of confusion of the issues. In the statement, Mr. Trujillo appeared to imply that a 
crime where one is an accessory is distinguishable from a crime where one is a 
principal, and that his being an accessory meant that he would get some sort of lesser 
penalty, namely probation. (See State's Ex. 2.) However, Idaho has statutorily 
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals. See I.C. § 19-1430; 
State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 973 (2008). Aiding and abetting is only a theory of 
liability, not a separate offense or crime of a different nature. See Johnson, 145 Idaho 
at 973. Describing the theory of liability as a crime of a different nature warranting a 
lesser penalty could have confused the jury. See United States v. Condon, 720 F.3d 
748, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2013) ("As the district court recognized at the motions hearing, 
describing the affirmative defense as a technicality or loophole could confuse or mislead 
the jury into believing that 'some technicality may allow [Mr. Condon] to walk away."'). 
Further, as the district court recognized when it initially excluded the statement 
(see R., p.84), the previously-excluded statement raises the danger of confusion of the 
issues because it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. As discussed above, the 
State argued that the statement was an acknowledgement of guilt. (R., p.84.) 
However, instead of being an admission of guilt, the statement may also be reasonably 
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interpreted as being Mr. Trujillo's prediction of the outcome of the case or his 
speculation as to the consequences. (See State's Ex. 2, 00:03-00:05.) 
Alongside the previously-excluded statement's implication that a crime where 
one is an accessory is distinguishable from and lesser than a crime where one is a 
principal, the statement's susceptibility to multiple interpretations compounds the danger 
of confusion of the issues. See Condon, 720 F.3d at 756-57 (affirming the district 
court's exclusion of an audio recording on the grounds of unfair prejudice, confusion 
and misleading of the jury as to an affirmative defense, where the district court based its 
determination on three possible conflicting conclusions that any reasonable person 
could reach after listening to the recording). Thus, the marginal probative value of the 
statement is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues. 
Because the previously-excluded statement is of marginal probative value, and 
the danger of confusion of the issues substantially outweighs the marginal probative 
value of the statement, the district court should have continued to exclude the statement 
pursuant to I.R.E. 403. The district court therefore abused its discretion when it 
admitted the statement into evidence. The judgment of conviction in the instant case 
should be vacated, and the instant case remanded for further proceedings. See 
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459 (Ct. App. 2010). 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 
Fourteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Trujillo Following His Conviction For 
Felony Forgery 
Mr. Trujillo asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
sentence because his unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Where a defendant contends that the 
11 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving "due regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest." State v. 
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Mr. Trujillo does not allege that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Trujillo 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal 
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ... 
consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 
(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id. 
Mr. Trujillo submits that, because the district court did not give adequate 
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider his substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence 
to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Trujillo reported 
first using marijuana at the age of fourteen, and methamphetamine at the age of 
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eighteen. (PSI, p.12.) He stated that he used marijuana on a daily or weekly basis 
before he was arrested for the instant offense, and that he would use about an "eighth" 
(i.e., one-eighth of an ounce) per week. (See PSI, p.13.) He also reported using 
methamphetamine on a daily basis, and estimated using half a gram to a gram of 
methamphetamine per day. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Trujillo further stated that he had used 
cocaine, heroin, and alcohol in the past. (PSI, pp.12-13.) 
Mr. Trujillo admitted to having a problem with his methamphetamine use. (PSI, 
p.13.) He stated that he did not get much out of his previous treatment programs 
because of his learning difficulties, and he was "pushed through" those programs. (PSI, 
p.13.) Mr. Trujillo also stated that he has a desire to stop using drugs and alcohol, that 
a treatment program would be necessary for him to do so, and that he is open to any 
treatment that he has not already completed. (PSI, p.13.) He reported that he needed 
to focus on his reading skills so he could understand his treatment, and wanted to 
participate in treatment as long as he is not forced through without gaining an 
understanding of what is being taught. (PSI, p.13.) 
Further, Mr. Trujillo's court-ordered mental health examination determined that 
he "does meet the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Amphetamine Dependence, in a controlled 
environment (304.40). He has been detained ... since July 2012. He reports craving 
the drug, developing tolerance, and continued use after arrests." (PSI, p.18.) The 
mental health examiner stated that, while his risk to re-offend was "moderate," 
Mr. Trujillo "appears most likely to get high instead of victimizing others." (PSI, p.18.) 
Adequate consideration of Mr. Trujillo's substance abuse problems should have led to a 
lesser sentence. 
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Additionally, the district court did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Trujillo's 
difficult childhood. A 2005 presentence investigation report, attached to the PSI for the 
instant case, stated that Mr. Trujillo "said that he had an extremely difficult childhood, 
noting that by age 9, he was living in foster homes." (PSI, p.111.) "Mr. Trujillo said that 
both of his parents died when he was nine years old." (PSI, p.111.) According to 
Mr. Trujillo, his parents were too old to adequately take care of him while they were 
alive, and thus he developed a history of running away and burglary charges as a youth. 
(PSI, p.111.) "He reported that around age 14, he was committed to a juvenile 
correctional facility in the State of Washington." (PSI, p.111.) Mr. Trujillo commented 
that his "feeling that he had not done anything wrong to deserve such a bad life 
propelled him to engage in delinquency." (PSI, p.111.) 
Mr. Trujillo's mental health examination indicates that he is still suffering from the 
effects of his difficult childhood. The mental health examiner stated that Mr. Trujillo "has 
experienced events as a child and adult that threaten his physical integrity; intense 
psychological distress as demonstrated by anxiety and depression; and efforts to avoid 
trauma-feelings by getting and staying high." (PSI, p.19.) The mental health examiner 
determined that "Adjustment Disorder With Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct 
Needs to be ruled out." (PSI, p.18.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Trujillo's difficult 
childhood should have led to a lesser sentence. 
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Trujillo's educational 
background. Mr. Trujillo did not complete high school. (PSI, p.10.) He reported having 
problems with dyslexia while he was in school. (PSI, p.11.) Idaho Department of 
Correction records listed Mr. Trujillo's reading level as Grade 6.6. (PSI, p.11.) Teresa 
Slack, an Instructor with the Idaho Department of Education, reported that Mr. Trujillo's 
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TABE score from 2010 indicated that his reading grade level was between Grade 4.6 
and Grade 6.9. (PSI, pp.20-21.) The TABE tests showed that Mr. Trujillo "is functioning 
on a minimum level of 4th grade and almost ih at the highest." (PSI, p.21.) At the entry 
of plea hearing, Mr. Trujillo told the district court he left school in ninth grade, but was 
now in a GED program at the jail. (Tr., p.299, Ls.11-19.) Adequate consideration of 
Mr. Trujillo's educational background should have led to a lesser sentence. 
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating 
factors, Mr. Trujillo submits that his sentence is excessive considering any view of the 
facts. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence 
of fourteen years, with three years fixed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Trujillo respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the judgment of conviction in the instant case, and remand the instant case to the 
district court for further proceedings. Alternatively, Mr. Trujillo respectfully requests that 
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand the instant case to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2014. 
1!:JP ·~ __-
-sE_N_P ___ M_c_G_R-EE-w---.<?:5 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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